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Teams in Online Scheduling Polls: Game-Theoretic Aspects

Robert Bredereck (TU Berlin)


Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken during the meeting, therefore each team would like to maximize its relative attendance in the meeting (that is, the proportional number of its participating team members).

We introduce a corresponding game, where each team can declare (in the scheduling poll) a lower total availability, in order to improve its relative attendance---the pay-off. We are especially interested in situations where teams can form coalitions.

We provide an efficient algorithm that, given a coalition, finds an optimal way for each team in a coalition to improve its pay-off. In contrast, we show that deciding whether such a coalition exists is NP-hard. We also study the existence of Nash equilibria: Finding Nash equilibria for various small sizes of teams and coalitions can be done in polynomial time while it is coNP-hard if the coalition size is unbounded.



Robert Bredereck
TEL 512

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