Research Group Algorithmics and Computational ComplexityTalk 09.08.2017

# A Stability Property in Social Choice Theory

Shaofang Qi (HU Berlin)

A social choice function $g$ is stable if whenever an alternative
$x$ is selected at profile $u$ and then profile $u^{∗}$ is constructed from $u$ by
only switching $x$ with $y$ for one individual $i$ who has $y$ just below $x$ at $u$,
then rule $g$ selects either $x$ or $y$ at $u^{∗}$ and not some third alternative.
Stability is strictly weaker than strategy-proofness but strong enough to
establish two kinds of impossibility theorems.

Joint work with Jerry Kelly and Donald Campbell.

Date
Speaker
Location
Language
09.08.2017
14:15
Shaofang Qi
TEL 512
English

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