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Inhalt des Dokuments

A Stability Property in Social Choice Theory

Shaofang Qi (HU Berlin)

A social choice function \(g\) is stable if whenever an alternative
\(x\) is selected at profile \(u\) and then profile \(u^{∗}\) is constructed from \(u\) by
only switching \(x\) with \(y\) for one individual \(i\) who has \(y\) just below \(x\) at \(u\),
then rule \(g\) selects either \(x\) or \(y\) at \(u^{∗}\) and not some third alternative.
Stability is strictly weaker than strategy-proofness but strong enough to
establish two kinds of impossibility theorems.


Joint work with Jerry Kelly and Donald Campbell.

 

Date
Speaker
Location
Language
09.08.2017
14:15
Shaofang Qi
TEL 512
English

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