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TU Berlin

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Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

Dipl.-Inf. Jiehua Chen (TU Berlin)

Voter control problems model situations where, for example, some external agent tries to affect the result of an election by adding some voters. Traditionally, in this setting, we can add voters one-by-one, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters.

In this talk, we present an initial study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add some voter v, we also have to add a whole bundle \kappa(v) of voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of our problem on two very basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.

05.06.2014 16:15
Jiehua Chen
TEL 512

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