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TU Berlin

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Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

Jiehua Chen (TU Berlin)

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the Anglo-American procedure and the Euro-Latin procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.

Date
Speaker
Location
Language
18.06.2015
16:15
Jiehua Chen
TEL 512
English

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